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Killing Two Birds with One Stone: Implementing
Land Reform and Combating Climate Change in
Brazil’s Amazon Under Law 11.952.091
Angeline Thomas
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LAND PROBLEM
Brazil is a land of contrasts. According to the United Nations, it is the
fourth most economically unequal country in the world.2 In the face of
enormous productive capacity, a dazzling geographical landscape, aweinspiring natural resources, and amazing cultural diversity, millions of
Brazilians suffer from hunger, malnutrition, and lack of access to basic
social services. Unequal distribution of land—harking back to the
Portuguese colonization of Brazil hundreds of years ago—is a signature
cause of the human inequalities.3 It has created enormous divisions in
society between giant landowners—who grow crops like sugar, soy, and
citrus for export—and the 4.6 million families with no access to land to
grow food for their children.4 Landless and rural people face malnutrition;
lack access to clean water, sanitation, and basic health or education
services; and spend a lifetime in roadside shantytowns of black plastic tents.
The focus of this article is whether a new law passed in 2009 entitled
“Legal Land: Accelerated Quieting of Title to Land in the Legal Amazon”
(“Terra Legal: Regularização Fundiária Acelerada na Amazônia Legal”)5
will benefit these landless farmers.
Brazil’s land problem is not the lack of land, but rather that its abundance
of land is in the hands of very few people who have been resistant to let it
go. Though the Brazilian constitution authorizes the expropriation (or
taking) of large unproductive estates that are not serving a “social function,”
the Brazilian government has routinely avoided using this mechanism to
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redistribute land to poor landless farmers. Consequently, land tenure in
Brazil is amongst the most unequal in the world.6 For example, the Gini
index is one standard economic measure used throughout the world to
assess the degree to which the distribution of income, or some other
resource, is unequal. For instance, a society that scores 0.0 on the Gini
index has perfect equality in income distribution. Where a country that
scores 1.0 indicates a total inequality where only one person corners all the
income. Thus, each percentage point over 0 indicates higher amounts of
inequality.7 In 2006, Brazil reached 0.872 on the Gini index measuring land
distribution.8 This means that Brazil has almost total unequal land
distribution.
Traditional expropriative land reform attempts have been met with an
overwhelming number of obstacles in Brazil. Historically, powerful
alliances of large landowners, politicians, and conservative actors have
blocked any significant attempt to enforce the constitutional mechanisms in
place to institute meaningful reform.9 Instead, they used their influence to
push for increased development, subsidies for large export crops, and low
taxes. To appease landless families, the Brazilian government substituted
policies of colonization, resettlement, and market-assisted land reform in
place of widespread redistribution of land through expropriation. The
government often looked to the Amazon, a region of abundant land that was
largely untitled (i.e., no legally recognized owners), as a potential panacea
to provide land and economic opportunity to the landless as well as satisfy
Brazil’s development needs. However, though some of these policies
enjoyed limited success in that landless families did acquire land and were
able to make a living, none of these policies have been widespread enough
to cure the land problem.
Furthermore, for those peasants who were beneficiaries of governmentsponsored settlement projects in the Amazon—or part of increased
voluntary migration—acquiring land came at a price of social unrest and
violence, a substantial part of which stems from conflicts over land
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ownership. Due to the fact that land was so abundant, that a peasant could
acquire rights to use the land simply by showing up and cultivating it for a
year and a day, and that the land titling procedure was too difficult and
complicated for many peasants to understand, many never acquired
ownership title to the land they occupied. As a result, many were vulnerable
to evictions from someone claiming to be the owner of land even if their
claims were false, fraudulent, or illegal. People who preyed on peasants are
known in Brazil as “grileiros,” or “land-grabbers.”10 Instead of defending
their legitimate claim, many peasants preferred to move on to another plot
nearby and start over rather than deal with a grileiro’s hired guns, or
government bureaucracy they could not understand.
Another unfortunate consequence of government policies like these was
massive deforestation in the Amazon region. Large land owners were
responsible for much of the deforestation that occurred in this region,
because they could exempt their properties from being eligible for
expropriation if they showed a “rational use.” In the Amazon Basin, a land
owner could show rational use if he cleared a forested area or used the land
to graze cattle, which also required clearing forested areas and planting
savanna type grasses to feed the livestock.
However, subsistence farmers also contributed to deforestation. In order
to prepare forested land for cultivation, it must be cleared first, and the
easiest way to do this for a peasant farmer is with fire—also known as
slash-and-burn agriculture. Rural farmers contributed to deforestation
because they faced two obstacles. First, soil quality in the Amazon often
declined after two years and rural farmers often did not have access to
technical assistance, like fertilizer, to help extend the productivity of a
particular plot. Therefore, they would leave the old infertile plot for cattle
grazing or for waste as they moved on to another plot to start the process
over again. Second, because rural farmers were vulnerable to eviction from
land grabbers, they would have to find a new plot, again starting the process
over.
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Though Brazil currently has many environmental laws designed to
protect the Amazon from deforestation, the sheer size of the Amazon—
together with the fact that land ownership in this region is uncertain—
makes enforcement of environmental laws extremely difficult.
Agrarian reform has been a crucial issue in Brazil during at least the last
half century.11 Social movements made up of rural farmers, like the
Movement of Landless Workers (MST), have continued to demand that the
government institute land redistribution, address poverty, and protect the
environment. Both domestic and international environmental groups are
simultaneously calling for reduced deforestation in the Amazon to help stop
climate change. Also, a strong agricultural lobby remains a dominant
political force interested in large-scale mechanized agricultural
development.
In June of 2009, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva introduced the
Sustainable Amazon Plan—a six-branch policy aimed at land redistribution,
poverty alleviation, and fighting deforestation.12 The subject of this article,
Law 11.952.09—one of the principal pieces of legislation intended to
implement the plan—was passed by presidential decree in June 2009 and
approved by Brazil’s Congress shortly thereafter. The law is aimed at
killing two birds with one stone. On one hand, the law is designed to give
land rights to squatters occupying public land in the Amazon, thereby
dealing with the problem of land redistribution and rural violence from land
grabbers. On the other hand, cleaning up the land title database will also
allow the government to monitor all registered land titles and better enforce
laws prohibiting deforestation.13 The goal of Law 11.952.09 is to grant
300,000 pieces of land to private owners over the next three years.14
This article argues that land reform that gives secure title to small farmers
is necessary because it is the best way to address the intertwined social
justice issues relating to the socioeconomics of poor and oppressed people
living in the Amazon and the environmental justice issues associated with
deforestation and climate change. This article will explore whether Law
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11.952.09 is a viable way to preserve the Amazon while granting complete
title to small farmers.
In order to determine whether Law 11.952.09 is a viable option, Section
II of this article will describe the historical and political background of land
reform efforts in Brazil starting in the late nineteenth century through the
present. Brazil’s current land problem began and has remained essentially
unchanged due to the dominance of the agricultural elite that held sway
over the government and effectively resisted both legal and social calls for
land reform. This section highlights particularly notable reforms, such as
the Land Statute, and shows how these reforms were undermined,
abandoned, or avoided by the ruling class. This section also emphasizes the
consequences due to the lack of meaningful reform—namely, violent
conflicts in the countryside, the role of social movements such as the MST,
and substitute policies such as market assisted land reform—providing an
evaluation of the successes and failures of such projects. Finally, this
section draws some conclusions about the viability for new forms like Law
11.952.09 in light of the historical backdrop just described.
Section III discusses deforestation of the Amazon rainforest in the
context of the historical backdrop described in Section II and in the context
of the current fight against climate change. This section addresses why the
Amazon rainforest plays an important role in fighting climate change and
describes why the type of land reform Brazil ultimately chooses for this
region will have important implications beyond climate change.
Section IV evaluates whether Law 11.952.09 can overcome the obstacles
of past land reform efforts that left many rural farmers landless while at the
same time combating climate change. This section argues that because
traditional expropriative land reform has never enjoyed the political will
necessary for it to be effectively implemented, this mechanism by itself
cannot succeed in redistributing land to rural farmers. Similarly, although
market assisted land reform was seen as the answer to the failure of
traditional expropriative land reform, it too failed to bring about widespread
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reform. Therefore, if Law 11.952.09 can combine the best of traditional
expropriative land reform with the best of market assisted land reform,
while at the same time incorporating positive environmental policies
completely ignored by both, Law 11.952.09 might finally fix the land
problem.
Section V presents seven recommendations for strengthening Law
11.952.09 to achieve its dual objectives. This section focuses on the need to
make the provisions aimed at traditional expropriative land reform more
robust.
Finally, Section VI offers some concluding thoughts.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF BRAZIL’S LAND REFORM LAWS
A. 1887–1934: Establishment of Large Land Estates for the Elite
The roots of Brazil’s land problem can be traced back to the Portuguese
colonial practice of granting large tracts of land to individuals or families as
political rewards and to encourage plantation agriculture.15 From 1887 to
1934, Brazil strongly encouraged immigration from Europe and Asia to
further the lucrative coffee and sugar industries that were major
international commodities.16 This policy favored aristocratic groups and
systematically denied similar access to large land grants to the nonelite
members of the white poor population.17 The elite were largely successful
due to African slave labor, but after slavery ended in Brazil in 1888,
additional measures were enacted to keep former slaves from securing land;
thus, maintaining a large permanent pool of cheap rural labor to serve
agrarian oligarchs.18 As a result, the main feature of Brazil’s agrarian
history is the formation and permanence of underutilized large estates
throughout rural Brazil, usually termed “unproductive latifundia” in local
legislation and general literature.19
The question of land reform first surfaced after the revolution of 1930,
which overthrew the coffee and sugar-based ruling class and precipitated
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accelerated industrialization and urbanization in Brazil,20 but land reform
was largely recognized as an obstacle to development. Consequently,
though the National Congress considered dozens of agrarian reform bills
during this time, none were passed into law.21
B. 1945–1964: Industrialization, Democratization, and Capitalist
Development
Despite the 1930 revolution, the elite completely dominated access to
private property until 1945 when Brazil experienced a cycle of
democratization.22 By 1950, the first historical movement for land access
took center stage.23 The demand for land reform was inspired by both the
Cuban Revolution and proposals from a then-influential UN Economic
Commission for Latin America. The latter group envisioned a process of
capitalist development.24 However, the Cuban example encouraged a focus
on the disparities between different classes. During this time, rural trade
unions were forming and political action gained momentum with the
formation of the Peasant Leagues and the semi-legal Communist party25 in
support of land reform. Land reform was seen as a fundamental policy that
would liquidate the political domination of land elites, contribute to
improved patterns of income distribution in rural areas, and in particular,
strengthen industrialization in Brazil after the formation of an enlarged
internal market.26
However, two barriers prevented reform from taking place: the powerful
conservatism of right-wing parties in control of Congress and the 1946
Constitution. First, large majorities of conservative politicians blocked any
discussion of land reform, let alone proposals of changing the legal
mechanisms of land reform and labor rights in rural areas.27 Second, though
the 1946 Constitution had provided for the expropriation of idle land that
was not performing a “social function,” it stipulated that fair compensation
must be paid to the owner,28 in cash, at fair market value, before any

VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 2 • 2011

1113

1114 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

eviction could take place.29 These requirements made land reform
impossible and, therefore, illusory at best.
Because of the lack of attempts to change the constitution or to
expropriate land under the impracticalities of the legal stipulations,30 by the
late 1950s, violent conflict between landowners and tenants or squatters
became increasingly common.31 As a result, the landowning elite called for
a hard-line stance against the violence and lent their support to the military
factions that promised to put an end to the social unrest.32
C. 1964–1985: The Military Dictatorship, the Land Statute, and
Colonization of the Amazon
As promised, the new Brazilian military government embarked on a
comprehensive program of land reform in order to quell social unrest. Soon
after taking power, the military formed a working group to draft an agrarian
reform bill. The “Land Statute” was the first government-drafted
comprehensive agrarian reform proposal in Brazilian history.33 The Land
Statute’s stated purpose was to promote “social justice” through more equal
distribution of land. The statute governed rural development, implemented a
land tax, regulated colonization, provided for technical assistance for
farmers, and created the Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform to oversee
its implementation.34
The most important reform in the Land Statute was that land in Brazil
was required to fulfill a “social function,” meaning that land must either be
cultivated for production (and worked in compliance with labor and
environmental regulations) or held for environmental preservation.35
Otherwise, the land would be considered “illegal” and subject to
expropriation (or government takeover and redistribution) provided the
owners were compensated. Thus, the statute effectively outlawed holding
large tracts of land for speculation purposes.36
However, land owners remained politically powerful and resisted
widespread land redistribution; therefore, the government’s commitment to
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egalitarian land reform was limited.37 For instance, instead of distributing
unproductive property owned by the elite, the military regime encouraged
owners of large land holdings to modernize unproductive land by providing
farming subsidies and pushing for soybean cultivation to generate large
surpluses for export.38 The ample access to government-provided credit,
together with the fact that soybean cultivation required large amounts of
land, resulted in the absorption of small rural landholdings by medium and
large-sized properties.39 Thus, land concentration increased during this
period because the more land a proprietor had, the more credit he received
and the more land he could purchase.40 Consequently, land reform in the
form of redistribution remained untouched.
Owners of large land holdings who did not choose to cultivate their land
were able to avoid expropriation through two major loopholes in the Land
Statute: the disproportionate tax structure and litigation. These two
loopholes disincentivized large land owners from selling their properties (to
landless families that might qualify for the rural credit discussed above) and
allowed large land owners to drag out the expropriation process for years.
The disproportionate tax structure overwhelmingly favored landowners.
For instance, minifundia, or small rural landholdings, were taxed at a rate of
68.7 percent of the assessment of their total value, while taxes on latifúndia,
or large rural landholdings, often amounted to only 18 percent of what these
large holdings should have had to contribute. 41 This means that it was often
in a small holder’s best interest to simply squat on the land they were
occupying to avoid high taxes. Conversely, because tax laws were not
enforced and/or were easily avoided, large land holders had little incentive
to break up their large parcels by the constitutional mechanisms in place. In
fact, most large land owners simply did not pay any taxes or chose to pay
insignificant amounts.
Another major loophole was the option that landowners had to dispute
expropriation through court litigation. Though the military regime did adopt
legislation to simplify procedures and accelerate the process of land
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acquisition, this legislation also gave landowners the option of delaying the
process for years through court litigation.42 For example, a local judge with
geographical jurisdiction over land that the government decided to
expropriate could allege various reasons to block or deny the government
evaluators’ access to land, thereby slowing down the process. Given the
common alliances among the local elites (including local judges), judicial
decisions were often unfair and resulted in controversial readings of the
law.43
Additionally, if a large land owner could delay the expropriation by
blocking the government’s access to their land, there was a chance that
either underused land would be rapidly transformed into “productive
economic activity” 44 or that the owner would take advantage of a better
market price as a result of the delay. In the first instance, often occurring in
cattle ranching land, neighboring farmers rush part of their cattle to the
soon-to-be expropriated farm before any evaluator checked the actual use of
land.45 In the second instance, land owners were able to use legal recourses
ad infinitum through their ability to pay for expensive lawyers—essentially
delaying expropriation by outspending the government in legal fees. In
these cases, the process of expropriation may be delayed for years—because
the government’s lawyer had to counter each of the large land owner’s legal
acts until a final decision was made by a higher court, the costs of defending
the government’s position spiraled out of control.46 While lawsuits were
pending, the market price of the land would often go up; therefore, the
landowner would often make more money by delaying a government
takeover.47
Another unfortunate consequence of the Land Statute was the expansion
of exemptions to expropriation, which led to massive deforestation in the
Amazon Basin. Medium-sized properties were exempt from expropriation,
as were all but the very largest properties that were currently being put to
economical or “rational use.”48 However, the definition of what was
considered “rational use” varied from region to region.49 In the South,
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cultivation was often required, but in the North Amazon Basin, clearing
forested areas or use of land as a cattle pasture was considered productive
use.50 Thus, large land owners clearing land or taking up cattle ranching to
show proof of “rational use” were responsible for two-thirds of the
deforestation of this area.51
As for poor landless families, the government favored a policy of
colonization on the new frontiers of the Brazilian center-west region, as
well as portions of the Amazon, in place of reform. In the 1970s, the
government took two actions. First, it launched a new federal agency, the
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (“INCRA”), for
the purpose of resettling peasant farmers.52 Second, the government gave
INCRA jurisdiction over 30 percent of land in Brazil and 50 percent of
public land in the Amazon. Poor families, specially recruited in the south of
the country or in the poverty-stricken northeast region, were offered plots of
wilderness land in areas still largely unoccupied if they agreed to relocate.53
Many peasants agreed to relocate because land in the northeast was mostly
titled and held by large land owners who allowed peasant farmers to use
small plots in exchange for free labor.54 These small plots were often poor
quality land, and the farmers suffered because of frequent droughts.55 In the
west, however, there was more rain, as well as large expanses of fertile land
considered to be public, and by law, people could gain a right to use that
land—rather than own the land—by simply occupying it for a year and a
day.56 Many farmers saw this as preferable to the situation they were in as
tenants and thus agreed to relocate to the Amazon. In order to obtain a title
to land in the Amazon, however, they had to pay fees and surmount
bureaucratic procedures that were largely incomprehensible to the average
peasant farmer.57 Consequently, as long as land was abundant, the farmers
saw no need for titles. If a rural family was evicted by someone claiming to
be the owner of the land, they would simply move to available land
elsewhere.58
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Some deforestation was also caused by the subsistence activities of poor
farmers who used slash-and-burn agricultural techniques to cultivate
forested lands. In order to plant land with crops like bananas, palms,
manioc, maize, or rice, the land must first be cleared, and the quickest way
to do so is with fire. For example, a typical process used by poor farmers
might look something like this: understory shrubbery is cleared first, then
forest trees are cut down, then after an area is left to dry for a few months, it
is burned, and then planted with crops.59 Deforestation occurs with this
initial clearing, but it is also exacerbated because after a year or two the
productivity of the soil declines on the original plot, and the transient
farmers must clear new forest for more short-term agricultural land.60 The
old, now infertile fields are used for small-scale cattle grazing or are left for
waste.61
Ultimately, the colonization program was doomed to fail because it was
poorly administered and did not involve explicit measures to provide
infrastructure, adequate technical assistance, or local markets for small
farmers. Nor did it have any provision for protecting land belonging to rural
farmers against invasion by speculators claiming to own the land when in
fact they did not.62 Additionally, in the mid 1970s, government priorities
began to shift from peasant farmers to wealthy developers who wanted to
develop large projects in mining, forestry, and cattle raising.63
D. Export Agriculture Favored Over Large Family Farms
In 1973, during its second stage of colonization, INCRA began to
abandon its focus on rural farmers and instead focused on large producers.
For example, it began to sell plots of 2,000 to 3,000 hectares (about 5,000 to
8,000 acres) to larger land owners with an explicit goal of forming a rural
middle class.64 Later that same year, INCRA sold plots as large as 50,000
hectares (about 135,000 acres), justifying this as a means of attracting more
capitol.65
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One of the justifications for these large-scale sales of land was that they
would create more jobs; however, not only did the jobs not materialize but
these ventures also led to massive deforestation. These large plots were
used primarily for mining and cattle ranching. Both ranching and mining
initially appear to provide employment in the clearing of the forest and in
the construction of mines and refineries. But once these businesses are in
operation, they are not labor intensive and therefore provide little long-term
employment for the average resident or migrant worker.66 Furthermore,
these activities allow a relatively small percentage of large land owners to
clear vast sections of the rain forest. Cattle ranching became the leading
cause of deforestation in the Amazon during this era as government figures
attributed 38 percent of all deforestation from 1966–1975 to large scale
cattle ranching.67
In sum, during the first fifteen years in which the Land Statute was in
force (1964–1979), despite strong constitutional language outlawing
speculative landholdings, the section related to agrarian reform was
virtually abandoned.68 In total, only 9,327 families benefited from agrarian
reform projects, and 39,948 from colonization projects.69 In fact, the Gini
index of land redistribution increased from 0.731 in 1960 to 0.858 in
1970.70 This shows that the small changes in the concentration of Brazil’s
landownership over the past fifty years did not benefit landless farmers.
These results led opponents of traditional land reform to argue that it had
failed.
E. 1985 to the Present: A Time of Conflict
1. Social Movements—The Role of the MST
The absence of effective land reform measures precipitated the formation
of grassroots social movements putting pressure on the government to
effectuate reform and, in some cases, taking reform into their own hands.
The most powerful and active groups include the Federation of Rural
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Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultural or
CONTAG), the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT)—a group associated with
the Catholic Church—a and the MST.71 This section will focus primarily on
the MST because of its overwhelming success.
Although agrarian reform in and of itself is not necessarily radical, the
MST has emerged as the most radical and combative group in Brazil.72 The
MST’s mission can best be summarized as “Occupy, Resist, and
Produce.”73 In short, the MST fulfills this mission by finding unproductive
land and then gathering enough people to take control of it.74 The MST has
enjoyed widespread support based on their success, organizing 1.5 million
landless members in twenty-three out of twenty-six Brazilian states.75
The MST’s work does not end with the occupation and acquisition of
land titles; instead, the movement’s success can be attributed to the MST’s
ability to educate its members and maintain self-reliance. The movement,
which is decentralized and highly coordinated, also provides its members
with basic social services that the Brazilian government is unable or
unwilling to supply.76 The MST boasts sixteen hundred governmentrecognized settlements spread across twenty-three Brazilian states along
with medical clinics for members and even training centers for health care
workers. The movement’s educational programs are especially impressive.77
Twelve hundred public schools employ an estimated thirty-eight hundred
teachers serving about one hundred fifty thousand children at any one time.
Adult literacy classes are offered to twenty-five thousand people through a
UNESCO grant, and the MST also sponsors technical classes and teacher
training.78 The landless workers have even established their own college in
the southern town of Veranópolis. The MST also gives some students
scholarships to attend other universities.79
The MST claims their right to land occupations is rooted in the most
recent Constitution of Brazil, which enunciates that land should serve a
“larger social function.”80 Article 184 of the Constitution requires the
government to “expropriate for the purpose of agrarian reform, rural
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property that is not performing its social function.”81 The Constitution’s
plain language does not give the MST the right to expropriate land by
forceful entry; rather, it gives the government the right to redistribute
unused land for social purposes.82 However, both the Higher Court of
Justice (Superior Tribunal of Justiça) and lower state courts have declared
that actions of the MST and other landless organizations might be
appropriate under the Constitution.83 In one notable case, the Higher Court
of Justice determined that “a popular movement attempting to institute land
reform cannot be characterized as a crime. This is a collective right, an
expression of citizenship, and it aims at implementing a program based on
the Constitution. Popular pressure is an acceptable means in a Democratic
State.”84 Similarly, in 1999, for the first and only time,85 the State Court of
Rio Grande do Sul overruled a trial court’s decision granting a landowner’s
petition to evict the MST off his or her property.86 The court reasoned:
Before applying a law, the judge must consider the social aspects
of the case: the law’s repercussions, its legitimacy, and the clash of
interests in tension. The [MST] are landless workers [who] want to
plant a product that feeds and enriches Brazil in this world so
globalized and hungry. But Brazil turns its back. The executive
deflects money to the banks. The Legislature . . . wants to make
laws to forgive the debts of the large farmers. The press accuses
the MST of violence. The landless, in spite of all this, have hope
. . . that they can plant and harvest with their hands. For this they
pray and sing. The Federal Constitution and Article 5 . . . offers
interpretive space in favor of the MST. The pressure of the MST is
legitimate. [I]n the terms of paragraph 23 of Article 5 of the
Federal Constitution [that land shall attend it social function], I
suspended [the eviction].87
This ruling is unique because courts will usually take one of two courses
of action regarding the evictions of landless families. Sometimes a court
will require the families to leave. Other times, a court will refuse the
landowners’ request and allow the families to stay and engage in
subsistence farming until the federal agency responsible for agrarian reform,
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INCRA, is able to determine if the occupied property is indeed
unproductive. This state court ruling is particularly promising for grassroots
democracy because it takes neither of these two paths. Instead the court
recognized the MST’s occupation of unproductive land as legitimate.
Land conflicts are not always resolved in court; rather, violence has been
used as a tool by the government authorities, landowners, and sometimes
the MST itself. A notorious example of government-perpetrated violence
was the 1996 Eldorado dos Carajás massacre where paramilitary police
gunned down nineteen MST for blocking a national route.88 The people
were part of a demonstration calling for the federal appropriation of an
unproductive ranch where the MST had mounted a camp called
“Macaxeira” with almost three thousand families. Over one hundred state
military police surrounded the MST on the highway and fired tear gas, live
ammunition, and machine guns into the crowd.89 In addition to the nineteen
MST killed during the massacre, three more died later from injuries, and
sixty-nine people were wounded.90 It was reported that many of the nineteen
dead were shot at close range and some were even hacked to death by the
protesters’ own farm tools.91 Via Campesina, an international peasant
organization that advocates for land reform, claimed that state authorities,
the police, the army, and powerful local landowners were involved in
planning and executing of the massacre.92
The brutality of the massacre got international attention and ultimately
helped to positively influence both national and international public opinion
of the MST’s mission of implementing agrarian reform in Brazil. For
instance, the massacre triggered protests abroad (mostly in Europe) against
the violence and impunity in the countryside, and helped to legitimize the
struggle for agrarian reform in Brazil.93 As a consequence, the MST
together with trade unions and federations linked to the CONTAG
organized a nationwide movement to intensify land occupations in
particular states like São Paulo.94 These increased land occupations also
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increased social tensions and paramilitary violence by the large
landowners.95
The MST, along with other groups, put tremendous pressure on the
Brazilian government to institute traditional expropriative land reform
under the land statute. The 1990s in particular saw increasing pressure on
the Brazilian government to address landlessness because traditional,
government-administered mechanisms, like expropriation, were not meeting
the challenge of widespread, efficient, cost-effective, and sustainable
redistribution of land. Around the same time, the World Bank was
proposing Market-Assisted Land Reform (MALR) as a solution for
politically unstable developing countries, such as South Africa and
Columbia,96 as more cost-effective, less conflictive, and complementary
alternative to traditional land reform.97 The World Bank began to focus on
Brazil as well when it began to observe the intensification of massive
occupations and the radicalization of conflict as a danger to the current
regime.98 As a result of the pressure from land reform advocates and the
World Bank, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardozo (1995–2003)
launched a new agrarian policy known as the “New Rural World”
instituting market-assisted land reform, or voluntary land redistribution, in
cooperation with the World Bank.99
2. Ending the Violence: Market-Assisted Land Reform
MALR is based on the willing-seller/willing-buyer concept, much like
real estate markets in the developed world, thus avoiding the lengthy
Brazilian expropriation land reform process.100 Under a MALR program,
rural community associations are supposed to select a plot of land and then
negotiate the price with the current owner. Then, once the purchase price is
agreed upon, the association can obtain a loan from the government
(financed in part by the World Bank) at a set interest rate to purchase the
property with cash and then redistribute it to individual families within the
association.101 This method was designed to increase the bargaining power
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of and reduce the cost of land for individual families.102 Additional grants
were available for community level infrastructure projects103 such as the
purchase of seeds, farming equipment, and fertilizer.104
Proponents of MALR argued that the “traditional model” of land reform
had deteriorated and led to bankruptcy due to paternalism, authoritarianism,
bureaucracy, centralized structure, disagreements, economic inefficiency
and sluggishness, inadequate approach to the agrarian component, and
incapacity to respond to the land market signals.105 In contrast, the New
Rural World policy sought to address the failures of traditional land reform.
First, it settled landless families under a policy of social compensation106 by
bringing together willing buyers and sellers and, thus, avoiding rural
conflicts and violence. Second, the policy decentralized land settlement
projects, transferring responsibility from the federal government to state and
municipal governments,107 mainly because local control was seen as more
flexible than federal bureaucracy (who was responsible for delay). Third,
the policy substituted the constitutional instrument of land expropriation
with market-based land reform based on the negotiated purchase and sale of
land.108 Facilitating land sales would allow the reform process to more
effectively respond to the market and thereby be cheaper and faster than
traditional expropriation procedures. Finally, the government was bound to
take part in the new program as part of IMF-mandated structural adjustment
programs as a result of debt.109
The MST, along with other land advocacy groups, strongly opposed the
substitution of a market-based system for traditional expropriative land
reform, arguing that it would not complement but displace traditional land
reform altogether. First, they argued that the World Bank’s justifications for
MALR were not sound because they disregarded the power relations
responsible for the historical deterioration of governmental institutions and
legislation related to agrarian reform.110 In other words, if land reform had
deteriorated and led to bankruptcy due the government’s failures, the reason
was not traditional land reform per se, but the government’s unwillingness
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to give it a fair try. Second, they also argued that the real aim of the
government was to take ideology and politics out of land reform and
thereby undermine grassroots support for rural organizations and people’s
movements fighting for land. They argued that availability of money to buy
land—coupled with talk of peaceful land reform, no more takeovers, etc.—
helped demobilize anyone wanting a piece of land to work.111 Third, the
World Bank refused financial support to any measure related to the
enhancement of the so-called traditional model of agrarian reform.112
Finally, they argued that land is not merely a negotiable commodity; rather,
land is also political, economic, and cultural.113 In rejecting the move
towards a MALR model, the MST and other land advocacy organizations
saw the new model as nothing more than a change in the state’s position
regarding social problems and a policy incapable of promoting the
democratization of the agrarian structure at the national level.114
3. Evaluation of the First MALR Project: Cédula da Terra
The first attempt to implement the model proposed by the World Bank as
part of the “New Rural World” was the “Pilot Project at Agrarian Reform
and Poverty Alleviation,” based in the state of Ceará, known as “Reforma
Agrária Solidária” (Agrarian Reform and Solidarity).115 The program
became popularly known as “Cédula da Terra,” literally “the land bill” (as
in dollar bill),116 because of the money associated with the program. For
example, between 1997 and 2000, US$150 million was made available to
stimulate land purchases and rural development (US$90 million of which
was borrowed from the World Bank).117
The project basically involved creating a credit line for landless workers
to buy land.118 Beneficiaries would organize in legally constituted
associations responsible for directly bargaining the purchase of land from
owners. Associations would then choose the farms to be purchased with
bank funds, which—given state approval of the project—would go directly
to the owner.119 The goal was to settle 150,000 families in three years (later
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extended to four years) at a total cost estimated around US$150 million,
with US$45 million coming from the federal government to purchase
land.120 The World Bank’s US$90 million loan was to be used to fund
complementary community investments. The remaining amount was
committed by state governments (US$6 million) and a community
counterpart (US$9 million), mainly in the form of labor.121
The primary goal of the Cédula da Terra project was poverty alleviation,
not land reform. The Cédula’s target beneficiaries were made up of landless
wage earners, renters, and sharecroppers, as well as poor farmers without
enough land for subsistence (minifundistas).122 Based on its goal of poverty
elimination, the Cédula’s settlement program was considered a global
success because it raised a considerable number of families above the
poverty line through its promotion of land access.123 The program also
showed that it is possible to settle one hundred thousand families per year,
even with a series of financial limitations related to expropriations.124 The
World Bank reported that the loan repayment rate by project beneficiaries
was outstanding, and the government and civil society stakeholders—
particularly the CONTAG125—showed a strong commitment to the
continuation of the program.126
However, despite some success, MALR in Brazil has been highly
criticized. The primary criticisms fall into four basic categories: (1) little to
no influence in the negotiations, (2) ignorance of the conditions of the
program, (3) lack of technical advice and poor quality land, and (4) lack of
infrastructure.127
First, a survey done by the Land Action Group confirmed that families
had little or no influence over the choice of farms or the negotiation process
that sets the price of the land.128 Instead, most of the negotiating was done
by government officials who ultimately set the course of any deal, based on
their knowledge of the funding limits and, at times, their personal
relationship with the seller.129 Additionally, associations of beneficiaries
created to administer the purchase of the land were often manipulated by
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large landowners. In these cases, the workers often did not realize that
negotiations did not favor them.130 On top of increasing the chance of
corruption, these facts also revealed a tremendous lack of transparency in
the negotiation process.
Second, families were often discouraged from participating in
negotiations because of their own lack of information. Interviewees
revealed that they had no information on the project’s basic elements,
especially regarding loan payment conditions.131 For example, except for
the grace period and final payment term, none of the individuals
interviewed knew their interest rates or even the amount to be paid in the
first installment (which was about to come due at the time they were
interviewed), much less the alternatives available if they were unable to
pay.132
Similarly, another Land Research Action Network study, done in 2005 in
coordination with several grassroots networks such as the MST and CPT,133
confirmed that many families never fully understood the terms of their
loan.134 Only 53 percent of those interviewed affirmed that they had
received a copy of the loan contract for the purchase of their land. Only 36
percent had actually read the contract. In spite of having received the
contract, 15 percent had not read it, which correlates to a high rate of
illiteracy among workers.135 Of the families surveyed, 42 percent did not
know the penalties listed in the contract in the case that they were unable to
pay their loan. Among the families in collective contracts, this number
increases to 48 percent. More than one-third of those interviewed (36
percent) did not know the number of loan payment installments to which
they had agreed upon signing the contract—26 percent admitted they did
not know the number, 7 percent did not remember the number, and 3
percent gave wrong numbers as a response.136 In short, all these difficulties
could be traced to the fact that many of the beneficiaries were illiterate.137
This lack of information demonstrates a large power imbalance between the
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naïve farmers and the landowners negotiating on their behalf, but contrary
to their best interests.
Third, the lack of technical assistance and poor quality of land
contributed to families’ inability to pay back their loans. Though situations
differ in the different settlements—particularly in regard to soil quality and
availability of natural resources such as water—the lack of technical
assistance or funds for investment were the most frequent complaints.138 For
instance, drought is a constant problem in the northeast; therefore, without
investment in irrigation projects, land will only produce a relatively small
amount for local markets, and the bulk of the harvest is reserved for selfconsumption.139 Consequently, low production on individual lots does not
generate enough money to pay back loans, and its even less for the
capitalization of new investments in production.
Fourth, contrary to the World Bank’s findings, the Land Action survey
revealed that there was a general lack of infrastructure on the land
purchased by small farmers, making it difficult for them to maintain their
families. For instance, 20 percent did not have electricity, 27 percent did not
have potable water, 48 percent had no access to schools, 74 percent had no
irrigation or access to water for production, 76 percent did not have a health
clinic, 29 percent had no health practitioner, 72 percent had no ambulance
service, and 22 percent had no public school transportation.140
F. Historical Conclusions: Implications for Law 11.952.09
The reality is that neither traditional expropriative land reform nor
MALR have successfully redistributed land to needy rural farmers by
themselves. While traditional expropriative land reform has the appropriate
legal mechanisms through the Land Statute and the Brazilian Constitution
to institute widespread, meaningful change, the implementation of such
reform is highly unlikely given the historical lack of political will.
Similarly, despite its difficulties and shortcomings, MALR has had some
success in redistributing land in an efficient, cost-effective, and less
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conflictive manner. Taking this into account, Law 11.952.09 recognizes that
traditional expropriative land reform and MALR can be complementary
alternatives. Before turning to the law however, it is important to
understand the domestic and international environmental concerns on the
subject of deforestation and, more recently, climate change.

III. INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER DEFORESTATION
Starting in the 1980s, the international community began to express
concern over the Amazon’s rapid deforestation as it appeared that the
government’s land reform and settlement policies were accelerating a
clearing of the rainforest.141 Between May 2000 and August 2005, Brazil
lost more than 132,000 square kilometers of forest—an area larger than
Greece—and since 1970, over 600,000 square kilometers (232,000 square
miles) of Amazon rainforest have been destroyed.142 In many tropical
countries, the majority of deforestation results from the actions of poor
subsistence cultivators; however, in Brazil only one-third of recent
deforestation can be linked to “shift cultivation” (a type of farming in which
the land under cultivation is periodically shifted so that previously cropped
fields are left fallow and subject to the encroaching forest).143 Instead, a
large portion of deforestation in Brazil can be attributed to clearing for
pastureland by commercial and speculative interests, misguided government
policies, inappropriate World Bank projects, and the commercial
exploitation of forest resources.144
When faced with the pragmatic problem of how to deal with a huge
landless population, and when untitled land is available in the Amazon
Basin, it is not hard to see why government-directed environmental policies
have taken a back seat to policies encouraging settlement.145 Deforestation
occurs because it is in the rational, economic, and legal interests of actors in
rainforest nations to cut the forest down rather than to preserve it.146
Deforestation allows rural populations to practice subsistence agriculture,
allows landless people to acquire a patch of their own, allows the private
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sector to produce commodities and sell them on national and international
markets, and allows local and national governments to generate tax income
and foreign exchange.147 Additionally, nations are able to strengthen legal
claim to widely uncolonized, unexplored territory and minimize border
disputes with neighboring countries. In this way, developing countries like
Brazil are only following the example of today’s richest countries, which
actively pursued deforestation and land use conversion to agriculture in the
early phases of development for exactly the same reasons.148
Despite Brazil’s legitimate desire to continue to develop, Brazilian land
conversion plays a particularly important role in combating climate change,
because the Amazon comprises about one-third of the world’s remaining
rainforests.149 Not only does the rainforest control the planet’s climate—
creating much of the rainfall pattern on which global agriculture depends—
but the rainforests are also home to some of the poorest people on earth
whose livelihoods are linked to the land.150 Consequently, the type of land
reform Brazil chooses is critical because it has direct effects on climate
change, which poses both a global and local threat.
A. The Rainforest and Climate Change
Climate change is the result of the accumulation of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere, largely due to human interference, that has been going on
since the industrial revolution.151 The general consensus is that countries
have different historical responsibilities for the phenomenon depending on
the volume of their emissions—known as “common but differentiated”
responsibilities under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).152 Under this framework, the parties to the convention agreed
that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of
greenhouse gases originated in developed countries, while per capita
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low.153 Therefore,
though all countries share in a common responsibility to address climate
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change, developed and developing countries should have different roles in
addressing the problem.
Because Brazil is a developing country, it does not have quantified
obligations to reduce emissions under the UNFCCC; however, Brazil has
acknowledged a responsibility to help mitigate the effects of climate
change.154 One of the most effective ways to do so is to reduce the amount
of deforestation occurring in the Amazon rainforest, because worldwide
tropical deforestation is one of the largest causes of global greenhouse gas
emissions.155
B. How the Amazon Rainforest is Important in Reducing Climate Change
Tropical rainforests, like the Amazon, are important in reducing climate
change in a number of ways. First, forest ecosystems decrease atmospheric
carbon dioxide through photosynthesis and store it in biomass and other
carbon stocks.156 This is commonly known as a “carbon sink”—a reservoir
that absorbs or takes up released carbon from another part of the carbon
cycle.157 Mature rainforests can carry up to eight hundred tons of carbon
dioxide per hectare.158 In fact, one study estimated that old-growth tropical
forest can absorb 4.8 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year through this
sink effect.159 This means that there is more carbon stored in the rainforest
then there is in the atmosphere.160 Consequently, when the forest is cut
down or burned, not only is carbon not being captured and stored, but
accumulated carbon is released into the atmosphere. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations body tasked with
reviewing and assessing the most recent scientific, technical, and
socioeconomic information produced worldwide relevant to the
understanding of climate change, estimates that the global forest sector
accounts for 17 percent of anthropogenic carbon emissions.161 This
percentage is greater than the entire global transport sector and larger than
the annual emissions in the United States or China.162 Put another way, just
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one day of tropical forest emissions from deforestation is equal to 12.5
million people flying from New York to London.163
Second, the rainforest provides an insulating belt around the planet,
reflecting sunlight and evaporating moisture, which helps to cool the planet.
The IPCC concluded that in order to avoid the worst climate change effects
to occur as a result of warming two degrees Celsius, global atmospheric
greenhouse gases must stabilize between 445 and 490 parts per million
(ppm).164 The present atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is 433
ppm and is increasing at 3–5 ppm per year.165 If nothing were done to
reduce global emissions, global greenhouse gases will exceed 490 ppm in as
little as twenty-five years. Though these numbers are dire, researchers
identified reducing deforestation as one of the largest opportunities for
carbon abatement.166
Third, in addition to the opportunity to reduce climate change, the
rainforest provides a host of other benefits such as regulating rainfall,
controlling global temperature and disease, and providing for forest
dependent plants, animals, and peoples. Also, the rainforest is a massive
freshwater regulator. For instance, the Amazon rainforest collectively
releases twenty billion tons of moisture into the atmosphere each day—this
is eight to ten times more water vapor than an equivalent area of ocean
evaporates.167 Some models suggest that deforestation could result in
reduced global rainfall. For example, the water vapor from the Amazon
feeds agriculture in South Brazil and may be carried as far south as the
agricultural heartland in of the La Plata basin in Argentina.168 This is
critically important because global food and energy security (in the form of
hydroelectric dams) in this region is supported in large part by rainfall.
The rainforest also controls the earth’s surface temperature by acting like
a global air conditioning unit.169 Deforestation means the earth’s surface
temperature will rise, which in turn, leads to more extreme weather
conditions such as violent storms, soil erosion, and flooding.170 For
example, Reuters News Service reported that extreme weather, linked to the
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warmest year on record, caused the devastating floods in Pakistan and
China last year (as well as the heavy rains in Australia late last year and in
early 2011) which disrupted coal mines and damaged transport
infrastructure.171 Damaged forests can also result in an increased frequency
of disease; for example, the 2005 drought in the Amazon caused disruptions
to high-quality drinking water supplies and natural medicines.172
Additionally, diverse animal and plant life is threatened by deforestation
and climate change. Brazil is overwhelmingly the most biodiverse country
on earth, with more than 56,000 described species of plants, 1,700 species
of birds, 695 amphibians, 578 mammals, and 651 reptiles.173 When
compared with the United Kingdom (where there are just twenty-nine
native tree species), every single hectare of rainforest contains dozens or
even hundreds of species of just trees.174 As a result, that rainforest has been
the source of compounds vital to the discovery and potency of many
modern medicines and has provided the genetic stock for many new crops
and plants.175 However, most species in the rainforest are still inadequately
researched, and therefore, their potential value to humanity and the
maintenance of environmental stability is yet unknown.176
Finally, an estimated 1.6 billion of the world’s poorest people worldwide
(those living on less than US$2 per day) rely to some extent on forests for
their welfare and livelihood.177 These people include subsistence farmers,
economic migrants, and “extractivists” such as rubber tappers, small-scale
loggers, gold miners, hunters, and harvesters of nuts, berries, fruits, and
medicinal plants.178 In Brazil, officially demarcated indigenous territories
comprise 140 separate peoples and cover 20 percent of the Amazon
region.179
Ultimately, climate change threatens not only especially vulnerable
populations, but also indigenous communities, local markets, access to raw
material for medicines, and biodiversity essential for the planet’s continued
survival. Therefore, the way Law 11.952.09 is implemented could have
very far-reaching implications.
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The next section will explore how Law 11.952.09 revives the innovative
legal mechanisms of the Land Statute, while at the same time it encourages
land markets to become healthy and robust through MALR mechanisms.
Additionally, Law 11.952.09 incorporates important environmental
protections that were not addressed by either traditional expropriative land
reform or MALR.

IV. CAN LAW 11.952.09 OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES OF THE PAST?
A. Present Day: Killing Two Birds with One Stone
Realizing the need to address land reform, continued social unrest,
deforestation, and climate change, President Lula de Silva enacted
Provisional Measure180 458/2009, which later became Law 11.952.09.
Notwithstanding other federal programs implementing land reform-oriented
settlement projects, environmental conservation, and the identification of
indigenous lands, the Brazilian government still holds approximately sixtyseven million unallocated hectares in the legal Amazon (approximately
13.42 percent of the total area in the region).181 The goal of Law 11.952.09
is to address the unresolved title question for more than three hundred
thousand families living in the Amazon, who live on the more than sixtyseven million hectares of land.182 The law establishes procedures—
especially aiming at rural conflict—to quiet title and settle questions of
ownership for land claimed illegally or under questionable title. The law is
also supposed to reduce deforestation by giving squatters legal title to the
land they are occupying and making it possible for land owners to be held
responsible for environmental damage.
1. Land Regularization Plan
Law 11.952.09 provides an opportunity for settlers to acquire title to the
land they are occupying without sale or auction based upon proof of
occupation or utilization.183 The titling plan is broken up into five different
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routes based on the size of the parcel: land up to 100 hectares, land between
100 and 1,500 hectares, land over 1,500 hectares, land given to states, and
indigenous land.184 First, plots up to 100 hectares will be given to around
290,000 occupiers for free, with ten-year titles of possession.185 This
provision incorporates a feature of traditional expropriative land reform by
implementing widespread land redistribution without a fee. However, this
entails giving away public land, not redistributing land concentrated in the
hands of one owner. Second, the government will confirm title of medium
to large plots between 100 and 1,500 hectares at discounted rates, and
recipients will have twenty years to pay for the land.186 This provision
incorporates aspects of MALR, because beneficiaries who are able to pay
for these medium-sized plots will help to grow the land market. Third, land
over 1,500 hectares will be broken up into smaller plots, and the owners
will be given government bonds, which will be paid over ten years after a
three-year grace period. This provision also incorporates some of the Land
Statute and the 1988 Constitution’s robust reforms, designating the
government as the primary funder of land reform and appeasing social
movements’ demands for land redistribution. Fourth, lands in 432
municipalities located in federal areas will also be regularized for the
benefit of the states. This provision will help to clean up the land titling
database. Finally, Article 4 of the law specifically excludes land used for
the military, public utilities, public forest, indigenous lands, federally
improved land, and traditional Maroon (indigenous) communities’ land
from regularization.187
For a title to be legitimate, the squatter must meet five requirements.
First, the beneficiary must show actual cultivation and occupancy as well as
peaceful, uncontested development of the property prior to December 1,
2004. In this way, the right to acquire title to occupied areas is retroactive.
This provision reflects an intention to support long-term occupants and
settlers in the region who have cultivated the land for years without the
benefit of secure title. This also prevents recent speculators from taking
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advantage of the law. Second, the beneficiary must be a Brazilian citizen—
native or naturalized. Third, the beneficiary cannot own other rural property
in Brazil. Fourth, the beneficiary cannot have been the beneficiary of a land
reform or land title legitimacy program at an earlier date. Fifth, the
beneficiary’s main income must come from the economic use of his or her
property.188 Finally, the beneficiary cannot be a government official.189
Law 11.952.09 also imposes certain restrictions on titles granted under
the program for title legitimacy, including restraints on alienation and duties
to comply with environmental codes. For instance, title documents will
contain conditions that apply for ten years, which if violated, require the
beneficiary to return the land to the government. There are seven such
conditions: (1) the owner cannot sell their parcel; (2) the owner must
rationally and appropriately use the area; (3) the owner must properly use
natural resources and conserve the environment; (4) the owner must register
legal reserves; (5) the owner must identify permanent conservation units
and recover degraded areas; (6) the owner must observe labor provisions;
and (7) the owner must comply with the terms and method of payment of
any loans, if applicable, within twenty years.190
Another highlight of Law 11.952.09 is that rural properties owned by
legal entities (i.e., corporations) are exempted from benefitting from the
law. Instead, the sale of properties owned by the federal government to
legal entities remains subject to bidding procedures under the Bidding Law.
In this way, the law gives priority to low-income rural workers who develop
the land for their own sustenance when bidding on land title from smalland medium-sized properties.191
Ultimately, the immediate effect of Law 11.952.09 is that settlers who
have been squatting on lands in the Amazon for at least five years can now
gain legal property rights. As the size of the claim increases to the
maximum of 1,500 hectares (approximately 3,706 acres), the burden of the
cost and procedures placed on the claimant also increases.192 In contrast, the
registration process for a free grant (for claims under 400 hectares) is
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substantially less burdensome. This shows that the law prefers small-scale
settlers of humble means already living in the Amazon; the law is not
intended to enable large-scale, speculative land grabbing.193 The question is
whether the Ministry of Agricultural Development, the administration
responsible for the program, can carry out its implementation in a way that
benefits small-scale settlers and not large-scale speculators?
2. Who Benefits: Land Grabbers or Rural Farmers?
Law 11.952.09 became law during a time of considerable controversy
and public debate in Brazil regarding the wisdom of continuing a
government policy of retrospective legalization of claims on public land.194
Proponents of the law refer to it as a lifeline, finally granting title to resilient
settlers and communities who have long forged their livelihood in the
Amazon region.195 For example, a senator from the Amazonian state of
Rondônia explained:
[T]his provisional measure brings encouragement . . . to the people
of the Amazon, who have been there for the past twenty, thirty
years . . . Lacking any federal agency support, they settled
themselves, occupying the lands of the Amazon, and for twenty or
thirty years, they have waited for a solution such as this—for a
titling process, documentation of the lands—in order that they can
call themselves the legitimate, true owners of land they have
occupied.196
Proponents also argue that assigning legal ownership of occupied land
will serve to combat land grabbing by the infamous grileiros and the
associated violent disputes over control of valuable land.197 One senator
listed the “reduction of serious and innumerable conflicts brought about by
the absence of a legal framework [for land] in the Amazon” to be a key
objective of the new law.198 Its proponents also assert that legalization of
claims will help distinguish valid settlers from public land speculators
involved in land grabbing (grilagem).199 INCRA, the agency responsible for
implementing the titling process, has calculated that more than 80 percent
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of the properties covered under the “Legal Land” program are no larger than
400 hectares, implying that the benefits primarily go to small landholders.200
The law itself applies only to claimants who assert peaceful occupation or
utilization of the land, exercised continuously and without opposition.201
Law 11.952.09 also corrects the legitimacy and representation problems
associated with MALR. One of these problems is that lands were purchased
by associations of workers organized by the large land owners or local
politicians. The Sustainable Amazon Program remedies this by coming to
the municipalities and interacting with the beneficiaries themselves. The
Green Arc Action Group, the agency responsible for implementing the
program, is in the process of visiting forty-three municipalities to register
land, provide credit, and offer a variety of other public services.202 Because
it comes directly to the people, there is less likelihood of corruption
involving municipal administrators, politicians, and unions, who were
favored in land purchase transactions under the World Bank program.
Furthermore, politicians are not allowed to purchase land under Article 5 of
Law 11.952.09.203
Neither are landless farmers vulnerable to losing their land through lack
of payment of high interest rate loans. Another problem with MALR was
that the poor quality of the land prevented farmers from turning a profit,
which in turn prevented them from making their loan payments. This
resulted in the widespread indebtedness of rural workers. Between 1997 and
2005, a World Bank rural credit program (Cédula) enabled land purchases
through negotiation with large land owners. However, small farmers often
did not participate in the negotiations and did not receive a copy of the loan
contract for the purchase of their land.204 Even if they did receive a copy of
the contract, many farmers did not understand the contract’s terms because
of the high rates of poor education among the farmers.205 Here, under Law
11.952.09, farmers occupying small parcels simply have to show that they
meet the requirements and they are given title for free—no negotiation is
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needed. This also avoids the chances of rural farmers getting into debt
through loans that they cannot afford and did not fully understand.
While the opponents of Law 11.952.09 point to many criticisms, most
fall into two basic categories. One is that the laws presumably developed to
support poor squatters who in good faith have settled upon and made
productive use of public land may instead, or in addition, provide a means
for powerful landowners and speculators to claim more Amazonian land.
This, in turn, will not effectively address land concentration. The second
main category of criticism, more generally, is that the continuation of posthoc policies legalizing claims on the public lands is counterproductive to
Brazil’s ultimate goals for agrarian reform and environmental protection.206
First, some groups have criticized the wide variety of beneficiaries
allowed because it opens up the possibility for fraud. For instance, nothing
in the law expressly prohibits a single person or company from regularizing
as many properties as can be kept occupied by representatives.207 In fact,
Felicio Pontes, Federal Prosecutor in the State of Pará said, “[Law
11.952.09] will legitimize land grabbing (grilagem) in the Amazon and
undermine fifteen years of intense efforts by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office
(Ministério Público Federal) in Pará to confront illegal appropriation of
public lands.”208 Though one of the requirements for obtaining title under
the program is that the beneficiary derives his or her main source of income
from the land, it is unclear how this will be enforced when dealing with
representatives.
Second, critics argue that the regularization provisions promote land
concentration. For instance, the average land occupation in rural settlement
lots in the Amazon does not exceed fifty hectares, mainly due to the precise
inability of a single family to operate on extensions larger than fifty
hectares.209 However, the measure expands the number of hectares one can
obtain up to fifteen hundred. This shows that the delivering of land assets to
enterprise is the economic priority.
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Third, under Law 11.952.09, the government cannot maintain its
responsibility to implement massive agrarian reform for small parcels while
maintaining a market-based approach for larger farms. Law 11.952.09
abandons agrarian reform by designating areas over 1,500 hectares that
should have been expropriated by the state and then turned over to INCRA
for redistribution. Instead, the law puts these parcels up for auction.210
Consequently, the law favors the elite because large parcels are only
required to be broken up into 1,500 hectare lots, instead of smaller ones that
are more appropriate for family farms.
Fourth, other than holding landowners responsible for environmental
damage due to new titles, the law does little to combat deforestation. While
the law improves on traditional expropriative land reform that actually
encouraged deforestation, it does little to stop illegal deforestation. Paulo
Barreto, a researcher with Imazon (a nonprofit organization dedicated to
protecting the Amazon) believes that the Legal Land program, together with
infrastructure promised by the government, will lead to illegal occupation
and deforestation. He observed:
Regularization is essential to improve control over deforesting;
however it cannot be so generous as to encourage new land
occupation—especially when combined with promises of waving
away fines. There is always the belief that land allowed to be
occupied today can become legal property tomorrow. And this
intensified occupation will, sooner or later, lead to more
deforesting.211
Similarly, Marcelo Furtado, the executive director of Greenpeace in
Brazil, voiced concern that despite the government’s best efforts, the
Amazon is too large to effectively monitor and enforce environmental
violations. He said the following regarding the attitude of lawbreakers:
[T]he . . . attitude is that because there is so little governance here,
because the government is so absent the truth is that we can just
keep cutting down the forest and nothing will happen to us. . . .
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This bill will be a major signal indicating to the people who enjoy
impunity that it is worth committing a crime in the Amazon.212
Instead, more research is needed to determine whether the other five
aspects of the Sustainable Amazon Plan better address deforestation by
strengthening the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and providing
tax incentives for sustainable development.
In sum, most of the advantages of Law 11.952.09 show that it has
effectively dealt with the failures of MALR described above, such as lack of
technical assistance and the inability of farmers to pay back loans.
However, the criticisms of Law 11.952.09 show that it does little to address
the failures of traditional expropriative land reform—namely lack of
government will and the power disparities between rural peasants and large
land owners. Therefore, if Law 11.952.09 is to effectively combine the best
of MALR with the best of traditional expropriative land reform, it must
strengthen aspects of the law that allow for expropriation. As for combating
climate change, it is still unclear what effect the law will have on
deforestation, but it is likely an important step in correcting the flawed
environmental policy of the past.

V. SOLUTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING LAW 11.952.09
Ultimately, despite its criticisms, Law 11.952.09 is an important step in
improving land reform and environmental conservation in Brazil. As
demonstrated, land reform in Brazil is a social, economic, and
environmental justice issue—not only for the people of Brazil but also for
the rest of the world. In light of this fact, measures should be taken to
strengthen Law 11.952.09. This article suggests seven ways to strengthen
Law 11.952.09: (1) Traditional expropriative land reform must be
complemented by, instead of abandoned for, market-assisted land reform;
(2) Brazil should revise and enforce the existing land tax; (3) Brazil should
amend the existing legal procedures that are taken advantage of for the
purpose of prolonging the expropriation process;213 (4) Brazil should
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prioritize family farming as a matter of social and economic policy; (5)
social movements should continue their work for improvement, despite
changing demands and institutional uncertainty; (6) Brazil should realize
that government welfare, while cheaper than land reform, will not only
undermine democracy but fail to cure the historical roots of inequality and
injustice; and (7) more resources need to be allocated to environmental
enforcement.
First, traditional expropriative land reform must be complemented by,
instead of abandoned for, market-assisted land reform (MALR). The
international community and the Brazilian government should acknowledge
that MALR, including mechanisms such as land banks and land funds, is
inadequate in highly unequal societies and therefore cannot replace agrarian
reform processes that expropriate large land owners’ land for redistribution.
Expropriations should be undertaken in strict accordance with the rule of
law, and land should be given to those who lack it.214 Law 11.952.09 is
poised to implement a hybrid model designed to leverage complementary
aspects of both traditional expropriative reform and MALR.
Second, Brazil can strengthen the benefits that Law 11.952.09 offers to
small farmers by revising and enforcing the existing tax structure,
specifically the rural tax. Because tax laws are not enforced and can be
easily avoided, large land holders have little incentive to break up their
large parcels under the constitutional mechanisms in place. In 1996, under
the Cardoso presidency, the Brazilian National Congress approved
legislation concerning the rural tax (imposto territorial rural or ITR).215
This legislation looked promising because the law reduced the size of
properties subject to the top tax rate from more than 15,000 hectares to
more than 5,000 hectares.216 In theory, this would have encouraged large
land holders to break up their parcels by sale or face heavy tax burdens.
Ultimately, large land owners lobbied Congress to reduce the tax rate on
productive land. However, the government succeeded in raising taxes on
unproductive land; the top rate for the largest estates rose from 4.5 percent
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to 20 percent.217 This compromise shows that ITR could be a powerful
complement to Law 11.952.09, because large land holders will have to use
the land they are on or be taxed so heavily that it would be preferable to
downsize.
Unfortunately, ITR has yet to become a powerful complement because
large land owners are notorious for avoiding ITR payments. For example,
one 1999 study showed that 98.7 percent of owners of the two hundred
largest properties were able to avoid paying the ITR. For the government to
charge the top rate of 20 percent, it has to show that 30 percent or less of the
rural property is being productively used.218 But given Brazil’s history of
vague definitions of what constitutes “productive use,” landowners have
shown great ingenuity in demonstrating land use and cultivating favorable
rulings from local administrators.219 Current numbers show that, as of 2007,
the ITR maintained a top tax rate of 20 percent, yet the lowest tax rate could
be as little as 0.03 percent.220 This means that large land holders are likely
avoiding ITR payments or paying very little. Conversely, because small
holders lack the power and financial resources to similarly avoid ITR
payments, they are likely shouldering the brunt of the tax burden, which
hinders their ability to be successful.
Third, Brazil should amend the procedures that allow for lengthy and
expensive court battles over land, which only prolong and complicate the
expropriation process. Brazilian law allows wealthy land owners to use
legal recourse to fight expropriation ad infinitum because of the numerous
loopholes for legal challenges. This problem is exacerbated when the
threatened farmer is rich and is able to hire the best lawyers, in which case,
the government must compete. This can lead to exorbitant costs, including
countering every legal act the farmer takes until a final decision is made by
a higher court. To date, no study has been done to estimate the cost of such
legal disputes.221 However, a study would provide the government valuable
information on what kind of legal reforms are necessary and indicate the
best ways to implement those reforms.
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Fourth, given Brazil’s unique climate, its amount of land, and the social
and economic benefits derived from small family farms, Brazil should
prioritize the small family farm as a matter of public policy. Small- and
medium-sized farms are actually more efficient than large farms. Smaller
holdings generally produce more than larger ones because an owner with
secure tenure is more likely to make long term capital and “sweat-equity”
investments than a cultivator with insecure tenure, whether measured
hectare for hectare or according to total factor productivity.222 A study done
by the Economic Research Foundation for the Ministry of Agrarian
Development showed that family agriculture was responsible for 10.1
percent of the GNP in 2003, valued at about US$55 billion.223 In addition, a
spokesman for the Small Farmers Movement reported that 4.1 million
families dedicated to small agriculture produce 80 percent of Brazil’s food
and make up 85 percent of the rural labor force.224 Furthermore, the family
farm more efficiently uses their land, creating a production value of
US$677 per hectare, while farms not worked by families only yielded a
value of US$358 per hectare.225 In sum, agricultural economists agree that
small-scale farmers generally use land, labor, and capital more efficiently
than large-scale farmers who depend primarily on hired labor or
mechanized farming. Large farms only prove to be more efficient when
measured by the advantages associated with tax breaks and subsidies.226
Fifth, landless farmers and social movements can and should continue the
struggle for land rights because they have been extremely successful to
date. Social movements are in the best position to continue to advocate for
institutional change in the face of uncertainty and difficulties. Zander
Navarro suggests that one major challenge for the future of agrarian reform
is the diminishing social demand for land in most Brazilian regions because
the unstoppable process of urbanization has reduced the numbers of
landless families demanding land.227 For example, in 1960, just over half
(55 percent) of Brazil’s population lived in rural areas; however, the 2007–
2008 census revealed that only 15 percent of Brazil’s population lived in
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rural areas.228 Now, industrial and service sectors dominate the economy,
and agriculture does not produce jobs in the same proportion as it once did.
This is due to mechanization and an increasingly technological policy
prevailing in agricultural activities.229 However, even given this reduced
number, an estimated five million poor rural families are still potential
beneficiaries of national agrarian reform.230 Social movements should
continue identifying and organizing these potential beneficiaries in order to
make their interests visible to the legislature.231
Sixth, given the cost of implementing land reform and the diminishing
number of landless families, some have argued that it would be cheaper to
offer a monthly payment to the rural poor than to work on the costly process
of land reform232—this would be a mistake. For instance, the government is
in charge of a host of social benefits for the rural poor—the most effective
being the Bolsa Família, a conditional cash transfer program in which poor
families receive a monthly payment on the condition that their children
attend school.233 Because most studies indicate that new settlers in most
regions of Brazil are not capable of producing a monthly income larger than
the minimum wage, the argument goes that it would be better use of
financial and administrative resources to simply enroll poor families in
social programs instead of maintaining a complex process of land reform.234
However, this would be a mistake because it only attacks the symptoms of
poverty instead of digging up the root. Access to land creates a multifaceted
impact in the lifecycles of landless families that would totally be
undermined if land reform were abandoned and replaced with government
welfare. The point here is not to recommend abandonment of social
programs; to the contrary, social programs are a vital safety net that should
not be abandoned, but to show that social programs in place of land reform
is not a good idea.
Finally, more resources need to be allocated to environmental
enforcement. Being able to identify and prosecute potential law breakers is
an important step in reducing deforestation. Not only will secure title give
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new property owners a robust set of legal rights, such as the right to exclude
illegal logging from taking place on their property, secure title will also give
new property owners the responsibility to comply with environmental laws.
However, in order for the law to be effective, more law enforcement
officers are needed to patrol areas prone to deforestation and prosecute
violators of environmental laws.

VI. CONCLUSION
Land reform will continue to be a critical issue for Brazil as it continues
to develop; therefore, Brazil must reconcile the tension between solving the
problem of landlessness while at the same time protecting the Amazon from
deforestation.
Ultimately, Law 11.952.09 presents an opportunity to overcome the
obstacles of both traditional expropriative land reform and MALR.
Unfortunately, it appears that Law 11.952.09 might fail to accomplish its
two primary goals of granting land title to three hundred thousand
individuals and combating deforestation because it fails to adequately deal
with the obstacles of the past. Instead, while Law 11.952.09 addresses some
of the practical problems of market-assisted land reform, in the end, it
relieves the government of its responsibility to institute widespread
expropriation and redistribution of land under traditional constitutional
mechanisms. Consequently, one expects to see a little dent into the
overwhelming concentration of land among the elite and increasing rates of
deforestation over the next three years if the law is not strengthened with
other complementary policies.
Undoubtedly, some families will benefit from Law 11.952.09. Instead of
completely throwing the new law out, the government should enhance the
constitutional and legal mechanisms already available. This would
discourage wealthy landowners from holding onto unproductive land and
would provide landless families access to important legal rights, thereby
incorporating them into the global marketplace. Meanwhile, Law 11.952.09
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integrates environmental protections that are essential to combating climate
change.
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